The intelligent water-fertilizer integrated system is the integration of advanced information technology and traditional water-fertilizer integrated technology. It serves as a vital platform to enhance the utilization efficiency of water-fertilizer through the application of advanced information technology. However， the development of intelligent water-fertilizer integrated systems in China is still in its early stages. The intelligence and quality of products on the market are low in general. The standard of product is needed to be established. This article uses game theory to study the behavioral and institutional factors behind the failure of market and propose potential solutions. The results showed that the subsidy policy failed to identify products with high quality， leading firms to produce intelligent water-fertilizer integrated systems with low quality. The collaboration between industries and universities or institutes in China did not provide enough reward to researchers， resulting in a decline of the research effort. Standard negotiation in a monopolistic competitive market caused the cost of transition higher than the potential benefits. In response to the issues and reasons mentioned above， the suggestions are put forward as followings： the government should optimize the subsidy system to strengthen the identification and subsidy of the intelligent agricultural machinery equipment with high-performance. The assessment mechanism of scientific institutions should be improved to enhance the service power of the transformation department of scientific research achievements in higher education institutions. Subsidies should be given to enterprises for changing the production standards of product， guiding the establishment of unified market standards.