University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
The collective governance is an important way to solve the problem of the absence of the governance subject of farmland water conservancy facilities and realize the virtuous circle in which facilities are used and managed. This paper explores the collective governance of small-scale irrigation and water conservancy facilities from the perspective of generalized morality and public leadership. Our purpose is to solve the problems of lack of incentive mechanism and low governance performance, and finally break through self-governing dilemma of small-scale irrigation and water conservancy facilities. The data used in this paper are micro-village survey data of 723 households in Ningxia, Shanxi and Shandong provinces along the Yellow River basin. This paper mainly studied the collective governance of small-scale irrigation and water conservancy facilities. A Multi-group Structural Equation model was selected to analyze the data based on the household agricultural income and province. The results showed that generalized morality and public leadership can significantly positively affect the collective action and governance performance. Collective action had significant and positive effects on the collective governance performance. The public leadership and households’ generalized morality promoted each other remarkably. Multi-group analysis showed that the household agricultural income level and province can significantly moderate the collective action and governance performance of small-scale irrigation and water conservancy facilities. Therefore, the government can promote the collective governance of small-scale irrigation and water conservancy facilities by deepening the cultivation of generalized morality, training village leaders and encouraging village elites to govern villages by combining the agricultural income in different regions.