Can the Intensity of Agricultural Land Management Right Increase the Number of Formal Credit for New Agricultural Operators?——Based on the Dimension of Law‒fact‒perception
Since the new agricultural operator rents a substantial amount of land,its loans,especially the institutional loans,are directly affected by the agricultural land management right. However,both the nature and the capacity structure of the land management right are ambiguous,making the relationship between the intensity of land management rights and the new agricultural operator’s institutional loans complex and hard to identify the causal path. This paper theoretically analyses the intensity of the agricultural land management right from dimension of law, fact and perception.With the help of the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis method(fsQCA),this paper digs out the configuration of the influence of the intensity of agricultural land management right on the new agricultural operator.It shows the law is not yet perfect now,but it has played an essential role in promoting the new agricultural operator’s institutional loans.The local infrastructure of agricultural land management rights is imperfect,so the capacity of fact dimension to improve the new agriculture operator’s institutional loans is limited.The perception of new agriculture operators is weak,which restricts the function of the perception dimension to promote the new agricultural operators’ institutional loans.This research’s policy implication means that strengthening the intensity of the agriculture management right need not only to perfect the agricultural land law but also to protect the new agricultural operators’ rights and enhance their perception of agricultural land management rights.
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