“利村”角色与“利己”角色
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国家自然科学基金面上项目“‘三权分置’下农地流转个体偏好研判实验及政策演进研究——基于豫鲁冀皖苏陕1493农户跟踪面板数据”(71874139);国家自然科学基金面上项目“农村公共政策个体风险研判实验及拟合匹配研究——以陕甘鲁豫1600农户为例”(7157320)。*为通讯作者。


Village Officials’ Roles of “Serving the Village” and “Serving Themselves”
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    摘要:

    村干部作为乡村治理基层建设的重要推动主体,其职务行为不仅是保证乡村有效治理的关键一环,也是实现乡村治理体系和治理能力现代化的重要影响因素。基于多重理论基础,划分出“利村”与“利己”这两种村干部角色类型以及“利村不利己”“利村又利己”与“利己不利村”三种村干部职务行为倾向,探讨村干部角色对于其职务行为倾向影响,并运用案例分析方法验证村干部职务行为倾向对乡村治理结果产生的异质性。同时在对“利己不利村”这一职务行为倾向进行深入机制分析的基础上,考察其典型行为的形成机理。研究发现:在村干部行使职务的过程中,本应扮演“利村”角色代表政府与村民来维护双方切实利益的村干部,由于个人精致利己主义的心理选择和行为动机,他们往往会以自身利益最大化作为一切行为的出发点和落脚点,并导致其“利己不利村”的职务行为倾向。由此提出规范村干部职务行为倾向的两点对策:一方面,加强村干部同级监督力度,完善政府行为监督机制,打造上下协同的双重监督体系;另一方面,完善对村干部的惩戒和激励机制,畅通晋升通道,形成“宽严相济”的管理模式。

    Abstract:

    As the important agents of the grassroots construction of rural governance, village officials’ occupational behavior is not only a key part of ensuring effective rural governance, but also an important factor in realizing the modernization of the rural governance system and governance capacity. Based on multiple theoretical foundations, the article divides the village officials into two role types which are “serving the village”and “serving themselves” respectively, and three types of village officials’occupational behaviors, namely “serving the village rather than themselves”“seving both the village and themselves”, and “serving themselves rather than the village”. This paper discusses the influence of village officials’ roles on their occupational behavior tendencies, and uses case analysis to verify the heterogeneity of rural governance caused by village officials’ occupational behaviour tendencies. At the same time, based on the in-depth mechanism analysis of the behavior tendency of “serving themselves rather than the village”, we studied the formation mechanism of its typical behavior. The research found that in the village officials’ occupational behavior, due to their refined egoistic psychological choices and behavioral motives, they often take the maximization of their interests as the starting point and the end point of all behaviors and have the tendency to “serve themselves rather than the village” while they should have played the role of “serving the village” to represent the government and the villagers to safeguard the real interests of both sides. Therefore, two countermeasures were put forward to regulate the tendency of village officials’ occupational behavior. On the one hand, we should strengthen the supervision of village officials at the same level, improve the supervision mechanism of government behavior, and create a dual supervision system of upper and lower coordination. On the other hand, it is also important to improve the punishment and incentive mechanism for village officials, smooth the promotion channels, and form a management model with “both liberality and strictness”.

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罗博文,张珩,余劲.“利村”角色与“利己”角色[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2022(2):102-112

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  • 在线发布日期: 2022-03-23
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