央地互动、多重逻辑与制度变迁——基于对建设用地一级配置层面的考察
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教育部人文社会科学研究项目“供给侧改革下我国建设用地双轨化配置的绩效、机理与对策研究”(17YJC790145);中国博士后基金项目“供给侧改革背景下我国建设用地配置市场化改革探究”(2017M611845);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目“我国城乡建设用地增减挂钩指标市场化配置改革研究”(2018SJA0033)。


Central-Local Interaction,Multiple Logics and Institutional Change:an Analysis of the First-level Construction Land Allocation
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    摘要:

    以社会行动者理论与多重制度逻辑框架为基础,从中央政府与地方政府两个行动者的多重逻辑出发,在央地互动视阈下对中国建设用地一级配置管理的政策演化与制度逻辑进行了解析。研究发现,在建设用地一级配置管理的制度变迁中,央地双方在多重逻辑的相互作用下,针对不同的土地利用计划指标类型,实质设立了差别化的行动准则:在中央权威有效性逻辑与地方代理自利性和局部自主性多重考量的相互回应下,对于新增建设用地计划指标,央地采取了掌控与突破的相斥性准则;在中央强公共性和有效性逻辑重叠与地方局部自主性逻辑的相互交织下,对于非新增建设用地计划指标,央地则采取了放权与执行的相容性准则。在这种差别化的行动准则下,央地双方展开了持续性互动,最终形成了新增建设用地指标愈发收紧的“计划管控”、非新增建设用地计划指标愈发灵活的“市场调剂”的“双轨化”变迁路径。由此可见,在央地政府这种差别化的行动准则下,中国未来的建设用地配置改革,不能只寄期望于诸如简单引入市场机制等治理结构层面的改变,还需要从深层次把握中央集权体制下央地政府的多重逻辑、管理诉求与互动策略,由此才能设计能够引导央地激励相容、优势互补的制度改进机制。

    Abstract:

    Based on the social actor theory and the multiple institutional logics framework,this paper analysed the policy evolution and institutional logics of the first-level construction land allocation in China from the perspective of interaction between central and local governments. This paper found that the central and local governments,affected by the multiple logics,established differential codes of conduct for different types of land use planning quotas in the process of institutional change. For the incremental construction land quota,both parties adopted an incompatible rule:control and breach,under the influence of the central government’s authority validity and the local governments’ self-interest and discretion. While for the non-incremental construction land quota,both parties adopted a compatible rule:decentralization and implementation,under the influence of the central government’s strong publicity and authority validity,and the local governments’ discretion. Through the continuous interactions between central and local governments,the institutional change of the construction land allocation has been shaped as a dual-track change path including the stricter “plan control” for incremental construction land and the more flexible “market adjustment” for the non-incremental construction land. Therefore,under the differential codes of conduct of central and local governments,China’s future construction land allocation reform is expected to depend on not only the change of governance structure by introducing market mechanism,but also the multiple logics,management demands and interaction between both parties under the highly centralized system of land management,so as to design an institutional improvement mechanism which guides the central and local governments to be compatible and complementary.

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王博,吕沛璐,冯淑怡.央地互动、多重逻辑与制度变迁——基于对建设用地一级配置层面的考察[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2019(3):130-139

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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-04-18
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